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Abstract—This paper presents the development of a spinning 
reserve market model framework for procurement of spinning 
reserve services, independent of the energy market auctions. The 
proposed model has developed an innovative spinning reserve 
biddable reserve calculation scheme which is dynamic and nature, 
and the full ac OPF is used to determine the spinning reserve 
procurement while taking into account system security 
constraints. The model has been applied to the CIGRE 32-bus 
system and detailed simulation studies have been carried out to 
examine the performance of the model. 
 
Index Terms— ancillary services, electricity markets, optimal 
power flow, spinning reserve, system security  
 
I.  NOMENCLATURE 
i,j    Index for system bus 
k    Index for hour 
Re{I}
  
Real part of transmission line current, p.u. 
Im{I}
  
Imaginary part of transmission line current, p.u. 
NG   Number of generator buses 
NL   Number of load buses 
MP   Energy market price, $/p.u.MW 
Pre   Transmission line real power, p.u. 
PD    Scheduled real power demand, p.u. 
PG    Scheduled real power generation, p.u.  
PMax  Maximum capacity of a generator, p.u. 
PR    Spinning reserve service price offer, $/p.u. 
PSF   Energy price scaling factor 
QC   Reactive power from shunt capacitors, p.u. 
Q    Transmission line reactive power, p.u. 
QD   Reactive power demand, p.u. 
QG   Reactive power generation, p.u. 
RAMP Ramp rate of a generator, p.u./h 
RSF  Reserve price scaling factor 
RC   Biddable spinning reserve capacity, p.u. 
S    Complex power, p.u. 
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SMax   Maximum limit on complex power, p.u. 
SR   Cleared spinning reserve quantity, p.u. 
V    Magnitude of bus voltage, p.u. 
Y    Magnitude of admittance matrix element, p.u. 
δ    Angle of bus voltage, radians 
θ    Y-matrix element angle, radians 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
SPINNING reserve is that extra amount of generating 
capacity, spinning and synchronized with the power system 
and available for immediate use when system demand 
increases significantly and suddenly or a contingency 
(generator or transmission line outage) occurs. Power system 
operators need to maintain acceptable levels of spinning 
reserve at all time in order to withstand possible demand 
excursions or contingencies. Under the traditional regulated 
utility structure, spinning reserve was determined and 
allocated during the unit commitment process, while in the 
new competitive electricity market environment spinning 
reserve is procured from the market. 
Spinning reserve has been defined as an ancillary service in 
the NERC Operating Manual [1] and has been categorized as a 
service to maintain a balance between the generation and load. 
It is classified within a class of contingency reserve services 
and is required that generators must respond to the ISO 
requests within 10 minutes. Spinning reserve as an ancillary 
service in the context of deregulated markets has also been 
discussed in the research literature. Some proposals have been 
introduced for the joint scheduling of energy and reserve 
service [2-7]. 
A mathematical model as well as its implementation for the 
New Zealand electricity market has been presented in [2]. The 
energy supply, energy demand, and reserve are dispatched 
concurrently in this market with transmission congestion, 
network losses, reserve requirements, and ramp rate limits 
considered. The problem is formulated as a linear-
programming model and solved with advanced dual simplex 
and interior point algorithms. A market model for both power 
and reserve generation resources was presented in [3]. The 
dispatch of the resources was constrained by limitations of 
system transmission capacities. 
In [4], a composite market framework for energy and 
spinning reserve services has been presented. Generators 
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 submit offers for energy and spinning reserve with ramping 
limits. Bilateral contracts are also considered in the model 
with incremental and decremental values specifying the 
deviation allowed from the schedule, determined by market 
prices. Transmission security is taken into account using a dc 
model. The clearing system is formulated as an optimization 
problem solved using an interior-point method. An 
energy/reserve joint market considering the reliability of the 
generators was also proposed by Flynn et al. [5]. It was 
modeled as an augmented Lagrangian dual function and solved 
by a recurrent neural network derived from a Hopfield-type 
network. The price for reserve and the unit reliability are used 
to find a balance between the cost of reserve and the risk of 
not providing it. 
Wang et al. [6] proposed a joint market for energy and 
reserve in which energy, spinning reserves and standby 
reserves are jointly scheduled and dispatched through a mixed-
integer model. Arroyo and Galiana [7] presents a contingency 
and network-constrained market-clearing procedure where 
energy and spinning reserve are jointly dispatched. It examines 
the short-term operation and pricing of the various products 
traded in a joint energy cum reserve market while accounting 
for transmission network flow limits and security constraints. 
The optimization process yields the UC solution and the 
schedules of energy and reserve. It concludes that the 
requirement and allocation of local reserves are not pre-
specified but by-products of the market-clearing optimization. 
The nodal marginal costs of energy and security are also 
defined. Both generators and loads can submit offers for 
reserve services in [6] and [7]. 
The objective of this paper is to establish a spinning reserve 
service market in deregulated environment wherein the reserve 
market is separated from the hourly energy market. Such a 
formulation can be applicable to bilateral contract dominated 
markets or any mixed form market structure. The proposed 
market is settled using an optimal power flow framework that 
considers market constraints and operation constraints while 
minimizing the total system cost. The selected generators 
receive a uniform market price of spinning reserve.  
III.  DESIGN OF SPINNING RESERVE MARKET 
The proposed market structure for spinning reserve service 
and the operation time-frame will be described in detail in this 
section. The market operates in three stages: the first stage 
involves receiving offers and market settlement, the second 
stage involves real-time invocation of the service and the third 
stage is post-operational calculation of payoffs. The work in 
this paper concentrates on the offer and market settlement 
process. 
The proposed spinning reserve market (SRM) is 
independent of the energy market and can operate in parallel 
to the energy market or after the energy market is settled, as 
shown in Fig.1 and Fig.2 respectively. In the case of parallel 
operation of the two markets, the generators submit their offers 
one hour before the actual delivery (Fig.1), i.e., they offer at 
hour k-1 for the service delivered from hour k to hour k+1. 
The market operator settles the energy market and the spinning 
reserve market simultaneously and determines a uniform 
market price for the service provision taking into account the 
system reliability and security constraints and received offers 
by executing an optimization procedure. The selected 
generators are activated in real-time after the market 
settlement. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Time-frame of SRM in parallel to energy market 
 
 
Fig. 2. Time-frame of SRM after energy market 
 
In case of sequential operation of the two markets, the SRM 
is settled after the energy market settlement (Fig.2). The 
generators submit their spinning reserve offers half an hour 
before the actual delivery and after the energy market 
settlement, i.e., they offer at hour k-1/2 for the spinning 
reserve service delivered from hour k to hour k+1. The same 
optimization process is invoked and the market settlement is 
obtained. The simulations and analytical studies in this paper 
have assumed the sequential operation of the two markets, 
although the result can be extended to the simultaneous 
operation without difficulties. 
A.  Structure of Offers 
The service providers (generators) submit their offers for 
spinning reserve services specifying the price and quantity. 
The offer price (in $/MWh) indicates a generator’s 
expectation of price per unit of reserve power for the time 
period in which the reserve is allocated, but not used. The 
generator is also paid at the rate of the hourly spot energy 
price, for the reserve energy that is generated and used. A 
generator will therefore make profit during the time period, in 
which the reserve is accepted and used, but incur a revenue 
loss because of the lost opportunity in the energy market if the 
spinning reserve is not used. The reserve price is much lower 
 than the energy price because the reserve has a lower operating 
cost. 
The offer quantity (in MW) indicates a generator’s spinning 
reserve availability during a given time period. The quantity of 
spinning reserve which a generator can provide during a one-
hour period, say, from hour k to hour k+1, can be determined 
from its actual generation at hour k-1, its scheduled generation 
at hour k, the ramp rate, and the maximum generation capacity, 
as shown in Fig.3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Evaluation of biddable spinning reserve capacity 
 
As shown in Fig.3 (a), if the scheduled generation for hour 
k is greater than generation PGk-1, then the biddable spinning 
reserve capacity of a generator at hour k (RCk) is given as: 
 
)( 1−−−= kkk PGPGRAMPRC  1−≥∀ kk PGPG   (1) 
 
In case of Fig.3 (b), the biddable spinning reserve capacity 
calculated from (1) is limited by the generation capacity and 
modified as: 
 
k
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k PRAMPPG ≥+∀ −1  (2) 
 
If PGk < PGk-1, then the biddable spinning reserve capacity 
is more than the ramp rate, as given below: 
 
)( 1 kkk PGPGRAMPRC −+= −  1−≤∀ kk PGPG (3) 
 
To generalize the above conditions, the dynamic biddable 
spinning reserve capacity of a generator at hour k can be stated 
using the following relation: 
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B.  Optimization Model 
Consider a power system with N buses and NG generators. 
Only generators that are participating in the energy market are 
eligible to submit offers in the SRM. Generator i participates 
in the SRM by submitting its offer, comprising the price PRi,k 
and quantity RCi,k for every hour k. 
The objective of the ISO is to minimize the total cost of 
procuring spinning reserve services while complying with all 
market and operation constraints for every hour. 
 
∑ ×=
NG
i
ii SRPRJ                (5) 
 
In (5), SRi is the cleared spinning reserve. The constraints 
in this optimization problem can be stated as follows: 
 
    1)  Bus power balance: 
A full ac-load flow is considered in order to capture the 
transmission losses accurately and take into account system 
security constraints such as voltage limits and line-flow 
(MVA) limits. The generation and load balance for real and 
reactive power at a bus can be described as follows: 
( )∑ −+=+−
=
N
j
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N
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1
sin δδθ      (7) 
 
    2)  Transmission line limit: 
The transmission line currents are functions of bus voltages 
and angles, and therefore line real and reactive power flows 
can be represented using bus voltages and line currents. The 
transmission line flow is constrained by branch capacity MVA 
limit. The line flow equations and constraints are given as 
follows: 
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    3)  Reserve limits: 
The reserve that can be procured by the ISO and cleared in 
the market is limited by the reserve offer quantity, i.e., the 
biddable reserve capacity, from generators. 
 
ii RCSR ≤≤0  NGi ...,,1=∀           (14) 
 
 Where RCi is given by: 
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    4)  Contingency constraint: 
Spinning reserve is often required to be a certain percentage 
of the load or be capable of making up the loss of the largest 
generator while sometimes these reserve requirements have 
been calculated as a function of the probability of not having 
sufficient generation to meet the load. The contingency 
constraint helps examine various load deviation conditions and 
contingencies to arrive at suitable reserve procurements. For 
example, when generator i is considered to be on outage, the 
constraint can be described as PGi  =  0 and RCi = 0. 
 
    5)  Generator reactive power limits 
These constraints ensure that the reactive power provided 
by the generators is within their reactive capacity limits. 
maxmin
iii QGQGQG ≤≤   NGi ...,,1=∀      (16) 
 
    6)  Bus voltage limits 
The voltage of load buses should be maintained at an 
acceptable level to ensure the power quality. 
Max
ii
Min
i VVV ≤≤       NLi ...,,1=∀    (17) 
 
The generator bus voltages are maintained at constant 
levels. 
ii VV =        NGi ...,,1=∀       (18) 
 
    7)  Market Price and Payment 
The uniform market price is determined from the highest 
offer selected by the market operator after the optimization 
process. All selected spinning reserve providers receive this 
uniform market price for the reserve that is allocated but not 
used. The generators also receive the energy price for the 
reserve generated if the reserves are activated in real-time. The 
payments are calculated after real-time according to the 
uniform market price and the energy price. 
IV.  CASE STUDY 
A modified version of the IEEE 30-bus system is used to 
demonstrate the functioning of the proposed SRM for various 
cases. There are 30 buses in the system, of which 6 buses are 
generator buses. The transmission system includes nine 132 
kV buses, while the distribution system includes twenty-one 33 
kV buses. The transmission system and the distribution system 
are interconnected with 4 transformers. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Modified IEEE 30-Bus system 
 
There may be various strategies adopted by a competitive 
generator to formulate its price offer for the spinning reserve 
service. In this work, the price offer is constructed as a 
function of the energy demand and market price. 
 
)Price ,(Price MaxMinuniformRSFPSFPRi ××=   (19) 
 
In (19), PSF is a price scaling factor that is related to the 
chronological energy demand for the day. The cost of 
providing spinning reserve service is high when the demand is 
high, and vice versa. RSF is a scaling factor for the reserve 
price vis-à-vis the expected energy market price. The uniform 
function provides a uniform random number generation in the 
range of the expected energy market price for the generator. 
This is used to model the offer price structure in the absence of 
more realistic price forecast information. 
The spinning reserve quantity offer of a generator can be 
determined by calculating the hourly biddable reserve 
capacity. The market operator uses the SRM settlement model 
described in Section-2 to obtain the optimal spinning reserve 
allocation schedule and the uniform market price. 
Consider a spinning reserve requirement to meet an 
unexpected 10% increase in demand. Fig.4 shows the 
relationship of total capacity, demand/generation, biddable 
reserve capacity and cleared reserve in the system. The total 
capacity is 10 p.u. in the system. The peak loads occurs during 
hours 9 - 13 and hours 17 - 21. It can be observed that the 
cleared reserve is the highest during these periods. However, 
the biddable reserve capacity is lowest during these hours 
because of the high demand. It is observed from Fig.4 that at 
some hours the margin between the biddable reserve capacity 
and the cleared reserve is quite small. This might give rise to 
gaming situation in the system by some imperfect market 
participants (generators). 
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Fig. 5. Relationship of total capacity, demand/generation, biddable reserve 
capacity and cleared reserve in the system 
 
The spare capacity in the system is calculated from the 
difference between the total capacity and the total generation. 
 
Spare Capacity = Total Capacity - Total Generation  (20) 
 
A comparison of spare capacity and biddable reserve 
capacity (Fig.6) shows the diminishing difference between the 
two, during hours 9-18, which can be a cause for concern. 
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Fig. 6. Comparison of spare capacity and biddable reserve capacity 
 
The biddable reserve capacity in the system over 24 hours 
vis-à-vis the spinning reserve market prices are shown in 
Fig.7. It can be observed that the spinning reserve price 
increases significantly when the biddable reserve capacity is 
low. The peak price during a day is about three times of the 
off-peak price. 
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Fig. 7. Spinning reserve market price vis-à-vis biddable reserve capacity 
 
The SRM price may increase when the transmission line 
limit is taken into consideration. If the transmission line limit 
is reduced and reaches a certain minimum level, the system is 
not able to survive because it is not able to procure enough 
effective spinning reserve through the transmission network. 
The system can survive under different transmission line limit 
at different load demand levels.  
Figure 8 shows the minimum feasible transmission line 
limits at each hour, for which the system can operate safely. 
The corresponding spinning reserve market prices are also 
shown in the same figure. It is observed that when the 
transmission constraints are more binding (i.e., the minimum 
feasible line limit is high) the spinning reserve market prices 
are high, and vice versa. 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Time, h
Tr
an
sm
is
si
o
n
 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
,
 
p.
u
.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
Pr
ic
e,
 
$/p
.
u
.
Minimum Feasible Transmission Capacity Spinning Reserve Market Price
 
Fig. 8.  Spinning reserve market price vis-à-vis transmission line flow level 
 
Figure 9 shows a comparison, with and without maximum 
transmission line limits. It is observed that the prices at hour 
17 and hour 21 increase when line flow limits are imposed. 
The market operator is forced to accept higher price offers 
because of constraints on the line flow, which results in the 
increase of market price. 
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Fig. 9. Comparison of SRM price with and without maximum transmission 
line flow limits  
 
Figure 10 shows a comparison of SRM price with and 
without the minimum feasible transmission line limit. It is 
observed that the market prices with limits are generally higher 
than those without limits.  
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Fig. 10. Comparison of SRM price with and without minimum feasible 
transmission line flow limit 
 
Consider an outage of the generator at Bus 1 (capacity = 
150 MW). It is observed from Fig.11 that the biddable reserve 
capacity decreases and the SRM price increases significantly. 
Further considering a case when transmission line 12-16 is on 
outage, we observe that the SRM price increases during some 
hours (Fig.12). 
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Fig. 11. Comparison of biddable reserve capacity with and without generator 
outage and corresponding SRM price 
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Fig. 12. Comparison of SRM price with and without transmission line outage 
 
The corresponding SRM prices are also determined. It is 
observed that when transmission constraints are more binding 
(i.e., the minimum feasible line limit is high) the SRM prices 
are high, and vice versa. Table-1 shows the cleared spinning 
reserve services during the peak load hour (hour 17) for each 
generator in the various cases discussed earlier. It is observed 
that the spinning reserve offer from Gen-2 is not accepted in 
the base case (without transmission line limits and outages). 
When transmission line flow constraints are applied or there 
are outages, the market operator is forced to accept the more 
expensive offer from Gen-2, hence the market price increases.  
 
TABLE-1: CLEARED SPINNING RESERVES (IN P.U.MW) IN VARIOUS CASES 
Generator Base 
Case 
With 
Transmission 
Line Limit 
With 
Generator 
Outage 
With Line 
Outage 
Gen-1 0.23 0.23 0 0.23 
Gen-2 0 0.14 0.43 0.47 
Gen-5 0.43 0.39 0.65 0 
Gen-8 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Gen-11 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Gen-13 0.61 0.5 0.61 0.61 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper establishes a spinning reserve service market 
model, which is separated from the energy market. The offer 
from a generator comprises a price offer and quantity offer that 
is the biddable capacity considering the scheduled generation 
and ramp rate. The proposed market is settled using an optimal 
power flow model that considers market constraints and 
operational constraints including transmission line constraints, 
while minimizing the total system cost. The selected 
generators receive a uniform market price of spinning reserve. 
Simulation is carried out on the IEEE 30-bus system. Finally, 
case studies considering transmission line flow limit, generator 
outage and transmission line outage are conducted. 
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